Introduction
Five commissions in the last five years have investigated the future sustainability of Medicare in Canada: the Fyke Report in Saskatchewan, the Clair Report in Quebec, the Mazankowski Report from Alberta, the Kirby Report (produced for the Senate), and the Romanow Commission (appointed by the Prime Minister of Canada). Notwithstanding the different ideologies of the governments that commissioned them, all of their reports have confirmed certain fundamental principles of Canada's publicly-funded Medicare. For example, according to the Romanow Commission's final Report, all aspects of its review pointed to the "overriding conclusion that there is no need to abandon the principles or values underpinning Canada's health care system." i The Canadian system rests on two bedrock principles. First, it is a system where access to important medical care is distributed on the basis of need, rather than ability to pay. Second, it is a system where services covered under Medicare are financed almost exclusively through general taxation revenues. Notwithstanding the endorsement of these key principles by multiple commissions, profound questions linger and will continue to linger long after the many volumes of commission reports have gathered dust. Specifically, these questions are:
• What health care services should be publicly funded?;
• Who decides what services should be publicly funded?; and ii However, as a country develops, it expands its medical care system beyond the "core" demanded by international human rights conventions to a much larger "core"; ambiguity prevails over what should be publicly funded or left to the private sector.
This ambiguity can be caused by an increased choice in health care delivery options due to technological or pharmaceutical advancements. How does one decide on which delivery option to choose? Is it a simple cost decision? For example, if a treatment costs $150,000 with a 5% chance of success, should this be publicly funded? Or, if a new drug achieves the same health outcome at a price that is 20% above the existing drug on the market but has no side-effects; should this be publicly funded? In theory, of course, the choices or decisions made should be a function of information about the relative costs and health benefits, a function of the values we hold about achieving different health states and the values we have with regard to equality and fairness (in Canada, these values are part of the Constitution through the Charter of Rights and Freedoms), and a function of available resources. The process, however, is complicated even further by the simple economic truth that monies spent on one thing cannot be spent on another and thus tradeoffs must always be made. For example, if the Ontario government spends an extra $150,000 on health care then it cannot spend it on education, so what do Ontarians get for this money in health relative to education?
A Decision-Making Framework Grounded in the Canadian System
There have been numerous theoretical models put forward as templates for guiding decisions about what should and should not be publicly-funded both in Canada and internationally.
However, while it is possible to speak in theory about how decisions should be made about what is in and out of publicly-funded Medicare it seems much more difficult to operationalize this in practice. The attempts to articulate the general principles that should drive decision-making about what is in and out of a publicly-funded basket both in Canada and internationally suffer from being too general, too abstract, and divorced from the complex details of any particular health care system. In particular, the existing models fail to take account of the politicaleconomy of particular systems. Any system of decision-making filters the consideration of values, resources and information about costs and benefits through local structures and processes.
As we discuss further below, in Canada, these structures and processes are characterized by accidents of history and long-held accommodations between governments and the medical profession, inflexible and inadequate regulations and law, and the interaction of different stakeholders and interest groups. 
Decision-Making in Ontario
There are at least four bodies/institutions in Ontario involved in determining what physician services are included in the publicly-funded basket of services. We discuss each of these decision-making bodies.
Physician Services Committee
Long-held accommodations between the medical profession and Canadian governments are fundamental to Canadian Medicare. Not surprisingly then decision-making over what physician services are publicly funded is driven by the process of fee negotiations between the Ministry and the Ontario Medical Association ("OMA"), the latter being the bargaining agent for physicians in Ontario iii Negotiations between the OMA and the Ministry effectively determine the range of physician services publicly funded. By default these services are deemed "medically necessary".
Thus the phrase "medically necessary" iv does not drive from an explicit application of principles but is rather determined by medical judgment as filtered through negotiations within the OMA and between the OMA and the Ministry and is a label applied ex post.
A key medium for the relationship between the OMA and the Ontario government is the Physician Services Committee ("PSC"). The PSC was created pursuant to an Agreement concluded in 1997 between the OMA and the Ministry and continues to operate pursuant to the 2000 Agreement. The PSC has 10 members: five members appointed by the OMA and five members appointed by the Ministry, and is chaired by a professional facilitator. In addition to being an important vehicle for governmental/professional relations, the PSC performs an important public role in reviewing utilization of services and recommending the de-listing of particular services in order to achieve certain financial targets. Different groups have, however, complained that they have had inadequate opportunity to make input into the decision-making process. Not surprisingly, most of these complaints come from groups of health care providers with a particular stake in the outcome. influential is no more diverse than the PSC itself. Both the Ministry of Health and the OMA have agendas that may not necessarily elide with the public interest: the Ministry's agenda is presumably often one of restraining government increases in spending; and the OMA's agenda is presumably primarily that of ensuring the interests of its members through fee increases. Of course, the argument against greater public participation in this process is that sustainability would be threatened as government restrictions on spending increases may be harder to enforce.
But this assumes public participation stirred into the mix of the present negotiation processes as opposed to first rethinking the accommodations reached between physicians and provincial governments. If the process of determining what is and out of Medicare could be unbuckled from determinations of what physician services to fund then it may be possible to establish a more rigorous and principled process, infused with public participation, that would allow relatively high benefit services and technologies to be in place of lower benefit services and technologies, already funded. It also assumes that greater public spending on health care is politically unsustainable whereas, arguably, with greater public participation in determining what is in and out of publicly-funded Medicare, there may be a greater appetite for tax levels necessary to sustain growth in publicly-funded Medicare.
Medical Registrars
What does someone turn to in Ontario if a particular service or treatment is not listed in the provincial tariff schedule because it is de-listed; or it is new and has never been listed; or waiting times for covered services are too long in Ontario?
The first recourse of patients in Ontario is to appeal to the Ministry of Health and Long Term medical necessity, and the relatively small size of an affected group is a more or less immaterial consideration.
Thus while the good news is that Medical Directors may have actualized the values of universality and portability into their decision-making processes the bad news is the more or less uniform agreement amongst Medical Directors about the relative unimportance of public opinion.
Most Medical Directors seemed to indicate that they never considered public opinion directly.
Reasons Medical Directors cited for avoiding this consideration involved concern at the public's lack of expertise in the medical aspects of these issues, including the concern that public opinion might be somewhat volatile, reflecting interest in a treatment because of its relative newness rather than with the weight of the medical evidence behind it.
There seems to be a deep sentiment that pervades government that it is better not to be explicit or transparent about how decisions are made regarding what to fund or not to fund. A spokesperson for former Health Minister Tony Clement is reported to have said that discussions regarding what is in and out of Medicare should remain behind closed doors: "Let's be frank, there will always be somebody saying, 'Don't do that,'" he says, referring to patients who will lobby to protect coverage of particular items. viii Thus the fear is that if decisions are transparent then it will be harder to ration services and control costs. ix In our work on Medical Consultants we have considered whether a lack of meaningful interaction with the public and a lack of transparency are satisfactory given the nature and content of the discussion that occurs at these inter-provincial meetings. We believe there is a strong argument for greater transparency, as opposed to more formal participatory processes, so that citizens, patients, and taxpayers can be assured of the basis upon which decisions are made or policy formulated and to provide a check to ensure that the principles followed in decision-making are those which reflect the larger public interest and values, as opposed to political or other interests. 
The Health Services Appeal & Review Board
In most provinces the only recourse from a decision not to fund a particular treatment or service is to seek relief in the general courts, either through judicial review or through a Charter challenge. In a limited number of provinces (Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia) there are administrative tribunals to which the citizens thereof can bring (on limited grounds) an application to review a decision not to publicly-fund a service or treatment. Ontario has the most active tribunal and a much larger mandate to review decision than the tribunals in Alberta and British Columbia, but, as we discuss below, it discretion is nonetheless still limited.
The ii. that kind of treatment is performed in Ontario but it is necessary that the insured person travel out of Canada to avoid a delay that would result in death or medically irreversible tissue damage.
In order to qualify for coverage an applicant must receive approval first from the General
Manager of OHIP before leaving the country. xiii We should also note that the total costs reimbursed are capped in a schedule and are significantly less than the actual costs incurred by most people who would travel to the US. It is usually when the General Manager denies approval under subs. 28.4(5) 2 that appeals with respect to the actual, substantive provisions of section 28.4 arise.
These issues tend to cluster around two sets of questions or issues:
1. Whether treatment is "generally accepted as appropriate" in Ontario for a person in the same medical circumstances as the appellant, and, 2. If so, whether it is a) available ("performed") in the province; or, b) whether a delay in treatment would result in death or irreversible tissue damage.
Thus, in order to succeed in an appeal with respect to section 28.4, the Board must answer two, seemingly similar questions, first in the positive and then in the negative. The Board must first determine that the treatment is generally accepted in Ontario as acceptable for a patient in the same medical circumstances, and second it must then determine that the treatment is not performed in Ontario; either as an objective or practical matter. This presents a Catch-22 for most patients as the Board seems to use evidence that a particular treatment is not performed in Apart from the substantive issue that the Board's discretion is constrained through the Act, there are also significant issues of access to the Board and transparency in decision-making. The
Board's judgments are not on-line and appointments must be made to view the judgments in Toronto -clearly, this has a disproportionate impact on anyone living outside of Toronto but particularly on applicants in Northern and remote areas. Moreover, the judgments are not indexed and one needs to know the name of the case in order to locate the decision. Through this analysis we hope to acquire a deep understanding of the factors that presently inform the Board's decision-making processes and make specific recommendations for reform of both the processes by which decisions are made; the composition of the tribunal (e.g. to better reflect the expertise required to make decisions about what to publicly fund); and reform of the framework legislation to better reflect the principles that should drive decision-making.
The Courts
There are two main mechanisms by which the courts play a role in determining what is in and out of Medicare: judicial review through general administrative law and through Charter challenges.
In general, success in applications for judicial review of decisions not to fund medical treatments is rare and the courts are deferential to governmental decision-making in determining what is and is not publicly funded. Courts demonstrate their deference to the existing processes for determining what is in and out of Medicare, by reviewing decisions on the standard of "patent unreasonableness." This is the most deferential standard of review possible in administrative law, with the other possibilities being "reasonableness simpliciter" and "correctness" (the latter being the least deferential In that case, the College of Audiologists and Speech Language Pathologists of Ontario (CASLPO) was unsuccessful in its application to review a decision to delist audiology services not provided under the direct supervision of a physician. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Pardu J.) held that Government's concern that it not pay for medically unnecessary diagnostic hearing tests is a legitimate one and further warned that a court should be cautious about characterizing structural changes to OHIP which do not shut out vulnerable persons as discriminatory, given the institutional impediments to design of a healthcare system by the judiciary. The applicants also failed in their Charter challenge.
Interestingly, notwithstanding that this case was not successful it has in the view of some in the Ministry of Health significantly chilled the prospects for further delisting to occur. The OMA Tariff Committee, which makes recommendations for delisting, does not wish to rise the ire of audiologists and one suspects they welcome having the excuse not to explore for further services to de-list and thus risk raising the ire of particular constituencies within the OMA, e.g. family doctors etc. So there is the prospect that the mere threat of judicial review, and the political heat that accompanies a judicial challenge, even an unsuccessful one, helps to perpetuate the status quo and reinforces rigidities in the system. 15.
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
Even if discrimination is found under s. 15 (1) it may be "saved" by s. 1 of the Charter which provides that "the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Thus a government may defend a finding that a particular policy or decision is discriminatory by pointing to the principles and processes that were followed in making a decision and how although the needs of those discriminated against were considered there were other countervailing needs or considerations that outweighed these concerns.
Section 15 has been used to overturn a decision by a BC hospital not to fund interpretation services for hearing-impaired patients, on the grounds that this decision discriminated against these patients who could not access and communicate with health care providers as other nonhearing impaired patients could. It has also been used recently to overturn a decision of the BC provincial government not to fund a relatively controversial therapy for autistic children (this is being appealed to the Supreme Court). There are many issues that are raised by the court's review on Charter grounds of decisions not to publicly fund treatments. The first point to note is that this is a one-way street and does nothing to counter the difficulty of delisting treatments and may exacerbate the existing reluctance of decision-makers to formally delist treatments that relatively are of less benefit. On the other hand, given that the Charter as part of the Constitution is as clear a statement of agreed public values as one is likely to find, the role that the courts play a critical role in checking governmental decision-making, decisions which increasingly based on cost-effectiveness analysis or desire to restrain government spending, may discriminate against marginalized and vulnerable groups. To eliminate then the prospect of successful Charter challenges and to ensure decision-making that respects public values, Charter issues should be taken into account at the time decisions are made to list or delist.
Discussion
Our discussion will focus on four themes: the extent to which our present system is designed to focus on outputs rather than inputs; the role of physicians and other interest groups in impeding and enabling reform; a consideration of the role for public values and public participation in decision-making; and finally a consideration of the role for law and legal institutions.
i. Focus on Outputs Rather Inputs
What then is the result of the layers of decision-making and the processes we have described?
We hypothesize that the cumulative effect of the processes is a form of stagnation and maintenance of the status quo, i.e. services are rarely delisted thus limiting the possibility of new services being added to the range of services that are publicly funded. There are few systematic reviews of older technologies and treatments to determine whether they remain cost effective.
Further, there is enormous resistance to changing the range and types of services that we publicly fund, primarily by individuals with vested interest in maintaining public funding for certain procedures. Also governments and medical associations are wary of being exposed to either judicial review or Charter challenge, even when the courts have indicated that they will be extremely deferential to decision-making in this regard and even given the relatively low number of successful Charter challenges. The net result is that newer treatments and technologies are looked at with a much more sceptical eye and are more frequently scrutinized for costeffectiveness. New drugs must not only prove cost effectiveness, but must also prove that they outperform existing drugs on the market if they are more expensive. New home care services must wait for additional funding before they replace existing in-hospital care. New hospital technologies are frequently delayed due to cost alone until long after they have diffused in other medical markets.
We have significant concerns about this approach. At a minimum, the principle of "necessity" must embrace the requirement of effectiveness (i.e. the treatment must provide a reasonable chance of achieving a particular health state (recovery, alleviation of pain, etc). Yet studies in evidence-based medicine in the developed world demonstrate little or no evidence of effectiveness for up to 30-40% of health care services that physicians recommend. xvi In any event our present decision-making process is not consistent with principles of cost-effectiveness, as evidenced by the fact that we have a system that fully funds routine annual general check-ups despite the consensus of expert medical panels since 1979 that they have little effect on the detection of disease, but does not fund life-saving drugs like, for example, insulin for all Canadians.
Much of the reluctance to fund new technologies comes from the fact that they relatively untested and usually quite expensive. In a system that has no formal mechanism to remove an expensive and ineffective technology, it is quite understandable that policy makers would be reluctant to introduce new treatments. However, many of these treatments may indeed be cost-effective and superior to existing treatment. Enhancing the flexibility to fund new treatments of relatively There are barriers to making this transition, but the question must be asked as to why we do not allocate resources to more high benefit procedures? The likely answer is that under the current framework, once a technology is adopted, it is here for good (at least until it becomes obsolete).
ii. Political Accountability/History and Interest Groups
We are seeking in our research to renew the basis of long-held accommodations between governments and the medical profession and could be the basis for a new deal that would increasingly reward physicians for performance rather than throughputs and inputs. Partly the problem here is a lack of incentives and the need to align incentives. We plan to explore through this research program whether new accommodations can be reached with physicians so that it is possible to unbuckle determinations of remuneration for physicians
from decisions about what is in and out of Medicare. We are also exploring whether it is possible to allow for a sorting of services across the spectrum of public/private financing and to cut through the sectoral boundaries that have historically characterized Canada's system (full public funding for hospital and physician services; mixed funding for prescriptions and home care)
given the conflicts of interests that may arise for physicians to whom the responsibility will likely fall to determine whether a particular health need is one that falls in or out of the publicly-funded basket.
iii v. British Columbia (A.G.) , the fact that "adequate communication is essential to proper medical care is surely so incontrovertible that the Court could, if necessary, take judicial notice of it" ((A.G) [1997] 3 S.C.R 624 at para 70, hereafter, "Eldridge"). Because communication between doctor and patient is so important at this level of decision-making, the law intervenes to protect it and encourage it a range of different ways, including the doctrine of informed consent and duties of confidentiality, contained in professional code of ethics, principles of tort law and equity ( particularly, fiduciary duties). xx We are grateful to Caroline Pitfield for making this point. xxi Romanow Report, supra note i at 63.
